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EGMA-30725

DIS. ATCH.-NO.

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich  
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/UPSWING/CART  
SPECIFIC— Ludwig ALBERT Case

DATE: 19 December 1957

Info: COS

Reference: EGMW-5262, 13 December 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

Attached for your information are copies of the material provided by  
ODIBEX as requested in the reference.

Approved by [ ]

Attachment  
as stated above

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3 - EE w/l cc att  
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DATE 2007

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR 1969

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ATT TO EGMA - 3072

31-7-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 23 June 1955:

It has recently been learned that the GO training school was disbanded during the week of 17 June 1955. The reason for this action could not be learned. The information was made public in a form letter which was circulated to the various GO agencies and has resulted in a multitude of rumors as to why such action was taken. One such rumor, stemming from Col. Oskar REILE, GO employee, purports that someone within the school was under suspicion by a certain Dr. HARTMANN (cover name) of having delivered information, concerning the school outside of GO circles. REILE, himself, would not be surprised if this were true, as he feels that (fm) MELLENTHIN, the man in charge of the school, has not devoted as much time to such matters (security) as he should have.

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ND 117-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 15 June 1955:

1. A member of the GERMANY Organization is one (fam) BOE whose cover name is HEDDER (this apparently refers to Armin BOE, presently with the Defense Ministry). He is part of the KÖHLER group and is primarily concerned with activities in the "Waldmeier". Personally unobjectionable, but with no special attitudes or knowledge, he strives in every way possible to carry out the exact desires of the GR. Since he is alleged to be equally responsible with HEDDER for certain security difficulties involving personnel, it believes him to avoid any unfavorable report about himself in this regard.
2. Major General (fam) KLEIKAMP a.D., chief of the GDR Augsburg office, and his assistant, Karl Beiss GERMARD, have for some time been suspected of being in the employ of the French Intelligence Service. The GR, however, will take no action due to lack of supporting evidence and will take action only when someone is able to furnish more facts concerning these alleged connections. Certain members of the GR who are aware of this suspicion are convinced that inquiries at the former residence of KLEIKAMP in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Leistekowstrasse 1, and a surveillance of both GERMARD and KLEIKAMP in Augsburg will furnish facts enough to decide the matter one way or another.

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KLEIKAMP  
Same address  
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1017-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 24 June 1955:

Information has become available which tends to indicate that on at least two occasions, persons have been hired for employment with the CO without having to undergo a background investigation. This information came to light in connection with the Reinhard FETT case presently being conducted by the Frankfurt/Main office of the CO. Ludwig ALBERT, chief of the Frankfurt office, requested that (fm) DILLNER, third ranking member of the CO, furnish the PPS or Life History to him as an aid in conducting the investigation. Finally DILLNER was forced to admit that no such document existed. The second such case was one involving Carl SCHMITZ, formerly of the Darmstadt CO office. ALBERT stated to DILLNER that his reaction to the situation was one of disjection in knowing that a person could be allowed to fill such a sensitive position without a prior check into his background. FETT has been employed with the CO since 1952.

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101-7-0175

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The following information was submitted on or about 23 April 1955.

Employed in the "Abteilung - G" section of the GRILAW Organization is a (fmu) PETT, who according to a recent report, has been a member of the KPD since 1951. PETT is divorced and his former wife (name unknown) is reportedly friendly with the mistress (name also unknown) of the owner of the Mainland Bar in Frankfurt/M. This woman, the bar owner's mistress, is suspected by the CO of working for the French Intelligence Service.

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DD 117-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 28 March 1955:

The GRIEBEN Organization, along with the RIV and Federal Ministry of Economics, has recently indicated an interest in the formation of an Industrial Counter Intelligence Commission. Although it has been rumored that Paul KOEHNKE, former Chief Security Officer of the Federal Ministry of Economics, has aspirations in this direction, the question of who will take over the task of industrial security after the treaty ratification is primarily a question of whether it will be the RIV or the GO. GO policy to date has been that of proceeding carefully and cautiously, even though a definite interest is apparent. In any case, the very good probability exists that the Beratungsausschuß für Betriebs- schutz - Advisory Office for Industrial Security - of RIV will be incorporated in any industrial security commission that is formed.

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10-1-7-11-7-6

The following information was submitted on or about 30 March 1955:

1. With the exception of very few persons within the hierarchy of the GEHLEN group, there is no one person knowledgeable enough to be able to furnish an exact, overall picture of the internal structure and personnel of the Organization. Except in isolated cases, no member of one group or department can give detailed information concerning a member of another group or department. In many cases persons within a group are acquainted with each other only under a cover name. Therefore, all knowledge of the organization and its workings is based on statements made by long-time members and on observations which have been made from time to time during the course of everyday business.

2. The authoritative position within the organization have been taken over by old-time former German General Staff people. The only exception is Department III F, which is led by Dr. (fm) KOHLER/KLAUSNER and which is staffed primarily by former Sicherheitsdienst personnel. This fact is traceable to certain sociological conditions from which can be drawn a significant social-psychological complex. It is known that KOHLER, a non-General Staff man, has a bias toward the General Staff people, who because of a traditional class consciousness, are presumptuous and frequently arrogant and insulting to the non-General Staff people. As a result of this, KOHLER has come to create in his department a counter-balance in the form of persons recruited from the ranks of the former Sicherheitsdienst. Because these men are not traditionally allied with the General Staff faction, and in most cases are filled with resentments against the General Staff faction, KOHLER, by incorporating them in his own group, has strengthened his own position within the GEHLEN Organization.

3. By creating a sort of closed shop, the General Staff faction has protected its ability to carry out its own desires in regard to personnel policy. In this connection, continued efforts have been noticed on the part of the General Staff faction to marginalize KOHLER's III F department as well.

4. Former so-called "E-Offiziere" of the Abwehrstellen are present in all groups and levels. They are, however, ineffective as a group and act only as a "filler mass". These officers are not the best of their lot. In the years 1934 through 1936 the best officers were needed at the front. The rest were used in the Wahrnehmungs- and Abwehrstellen. It was from this group that GEHLEN had to draw in reconstructing his organization, which had to be rebuilt from the ground up. At the present time, the personnel situation is considered difficult and as such is treated as a "restricted matter".

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10117-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 30 March 1955:

1. The person in charge of the GEHLEN Organization's Darmstadt office is General (fmu) KRISTSCHEMER, alias KORNIG. KRISTSCHEMER was formerly the military attaché to the German Embassy in Tokyo.

SORGE  
contact?

2. Dr. (fmu) SCHUMACHER, formerly identified as a GEHLEN employee in the GEHLEN office in Darmstadt is no longer employed by the GO. In addition to being named as a GEHLEN employee in a book written by Hans Joachim GEYER, SCHUMACHER was involved in an operational blunder that took place recently in Berlin. An operation was taking place during which a contact was to be made in a bar in West Berlin. Even though SCHUMACHER was warned that the French Intelligence was behind the whole thing, he wanted to intercalate. He was, however, not equal to the task and was, as a result, "taken in" by his opponents. In the end SCHUMACHER suffered a nervous breakdown and was subsequently relieved of his position with the GEHLEN group.

3. Werner REPPENIG recently came under fire in the GO as a possible cause for Karl PFORR being released as the head of the Land Hesse LVF. He is believed to have committed indiscretions which tipped off the Land Ministry of Interior to the fact that PFORR had been passing information on to the GO. REPPENIG is presently under investigation by the GO in connection with his contacts with Arno NAMECK, PFORR's predecessor as chief of the Land Hesse LVF. At one time in a personal letter written by Ludwig ALBERT, GEHLEN employee in the Frankfurt area, ALBERT described REPPENIG as being a "charlatan" and a "tramp".

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AD 117-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 22 March 1955:

1. Dr. (fmn) SCHUMACHER, alias SCHUBERT, is believed to be working in the GEHEIM Organization's Darmstadt office. During World War II, SCHUMACHER who was at that time a Kripo official, was assigned for a time to the Breslau (now Poland) Kripo office. After the war, because of his service in Breslau, he was involved in the Stalag III trial. As a result of this trial, Josias, Prince of Waldeck, and the Breslau Kripo Chief (fmn) WILHELM (until 1939 WEIZENKIRCH) were given long prison sentences by the British.

2. In the course of these proceedings, SCHUMACHER was arrested and taken to England, where he was held for a time. At the same time the English were searching unsuccessfully for one Dr. Günther ABSALOW, also formerly of the Breslau police. A short time later, SCHUMACHER was unexpectedly released by the British and appeared soon afterward in Hannover, where he attempted through acquaintances to determine the whereabouts of ABSALOW. He was suspected of having been released by the British for just this purpose. His efforts, therefore, were futile.

3. SCHUMACHER was on the Soviet pick-up list at the time of these incidents. It is felt that the British used this as a lever to get SCHUMACHER to do their bidding. Otherwise he would not have acted for the British except under such pressure.

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101-7-0-170

The following information was submitted on or about 3 December 1954:

1. The GERMEN Organization is attributing considerable importance to a certain phase of a fairly unimportant trial taking place in Linn/Rhine, Germany, which may reveal a heretofore undetermined weakness in the security aspect of the Organization. The trial, resulting from legal proceedings initiated by Frau Friedel BREITNER, née HINTZE, residing in Dassel, Bahnhofstrasse 12, against the editorial staff of the publication "Freies Volk". KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) PW (Parteivorstand - Party Headquarters) news organ, is based on a December 1953 article naming HINTZE as an agent of the GERMEN Organization. In reality, the article was an extract from a Soviet Zone publication which exposed some West Zone residents as so called agents for the Organization.
2. HINTZE was for a short time in contact with GERMEN people, but she was not aware of the Organization for which she was working at the time.
3. The interesting phase of the trial for the Organization lies in defense attorney's statement that his source can produce two individuals who can prove that HINTZE was an agent of the GERMEN Organization. In order to do this, the court may request that the two individuals be identified. This may identify a "leak" in the Organization.

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The following information was submitted on or about 29 October.

1. The "Waldkapelle" (Security Section) of the GEHLEN organization works independently of the Personnel Department of the GESTAPO General Direction (GD). The Personnel Department however does carry leads to the Chief of the "Waldkapelle", particularly when they concern criminal investigations. The Chief of the "Waldkapelle" at the time was the former Lt Col Dr. (mu) KOHLER, alias BAUERNBAU, an Austrian general residing in Munich. He was a protege of the GESTAPO's first chief (mu) BAUM, since deceased, although he was able at the same time to establish himself with General GEHLEN who even during BAUM's lifetime was looked upon as the ~~chief~~ chief of the organization. Whether or not the name BAUEN was his alias is unknown. BAUEN

2. KOHLER's past is not altogether clear. During the war he was a reserve officer with counter intelligence. For certain unknown reasons he would not risk returning to his native Austria, and on the occasion of brief visits to relatives there, he invariably traveled with extreme caution.

3. With KOHLER as the overall chief of the "Waldkapelle", latter's activities have not been conducted as an independent organization. Rather, certain groups of Department III within the General Agencies (G, General Vertretungen) performed the Waldkapelle work besides their regular Department III duties. However, for a long time the Department III staff devoted their energies more to tasks appropriate to a political police, rather than to Department III assignments proper. This was due both to frequent instructions from leadership from above as well as to arbitrary and aimless assignments of the individuals concerned as well as at headquarters level. The staff was anxious to deliver as much material as possible to the Soviets, with the result that their production could be gauged more by quantity than by quality. In particular, the Department III units devoted much attention to more or less unimportant local Communist activities. This is why hardly anything was undertaken within the framework of the Waldkapelle. KOHLER not only failed to notice these negative results, he never took any initiative to push the implementation of his own mission.

4. Thus was the negative course of events until the publication of the sensational East German press releases of December 1953. All possibilities has been thoroughly checked. It was established that the Soviets' knowledge of the GEHLEN organization did not stem from revelations made by persons apprehended in the East Zone in the course of security raids, nor from kidnapped individuals. Rather, the conclusion was reached that the Soviets should have gained their knowledge only through the treason of someone within the GEHLEN organization. KOHLER still stubbornly clings to his position against this conclusion. He doubts the possibility of treason without, however, giving any valid reason for an opinion which others in the GD share.

5. After the aforementioned 1953 revelations the entire organiza-

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tion of Department III was liquidated and built up anew, for tactical reasons. Since that time, i.e. early 1954, the "Mainstays" has its own organization composed of two independent agencies for the whole GEHLEN organization, again under a central chief, who is once more KOHLER.

6. In the opinion of one member of the GEHLEN Organization (presumably this refers to ALBERT himself), KOHLER is primarily to blame for the past failures. To say the least, he lacks professional qualifications. As to his own background, not everything is clear in that respect either. He enjoys a privileged position only because he was in the organization from its infancy. KOHLER was never classified in any case. This man (apparently ALBERT again) had made his opinion of KOHLER clear to the OB and, in the week ending 25 September 1954, spoke about KOHLER to (fm) DILLER, alias DILLINGER, a molester of GEHLEN who recently returned from South Africa and is presently considered the third ranking man in the GEHLEN Organization. He gained the impression that DILLINGER shared his views of KOHLER, but in proceeding with caution in this matter only out of consideration for GEHLEN's own methods.

7. The suspicion that Helmut FELPE and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst - Nazi Security Service) clique which followed him into the organization are "enemies" has been growing steadily. About ten weeks ago FELPE showed up at one of GEHLEN Organization's offices in Munich. FELPE in reality had no grounds for being present. It was ascertained later that FELPE had made his appearance in various offices, each time asking for something or other, obviously with the intent of engaging in conversation, only to retreat then stating that he was in the wrong office. The incident was immediately reported to the OB with a view to forbidding FELPE access to any of the offices unless in the accomplishment of regular business. This was accomplished. At this point, FELPE is being kept away from Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the Ruhr area, because he is not trusted. However, it is necessary to let him travel to these areas now and then since he still has two live contacts there. It is reported that FELPE still is in touch with former Cologne state prosecutor (fm) HERRMANN, who since 1950 is with the LfV (Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz - State Office for the Protection of the Constitution) in Dusseldorf. Shortly after FELPE was seen at the Munich office, that office received a postcard addressed to "City Office of the Gehlen Organization, Seestadt". The unknown writer of this postcard expressed thanks for having had the opportunity of taking interesting pictures at the entrance of the "Seestadt". This postcard is now in the possession of the GEHLEN OB, and is being treated as highly secret. More too, FELPE is suspected, who undoubtedly sought revenge for the dressing down he was subjected to. It is likewise suspected that FELPE had something to do with the Ludwigsburg affair. With reference to that affair, the man who was apprehended after the film was found, as he was walking toward the cache, is Walter KUNKE, born 9 July 1908 in Berlin. He is currently being held in protective custody in Ingolstadt upon order of the Chief Prosecutor.

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W 147-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 28 September  
1954. Surely Albert submitted it before this.

1. A quick glance at the film report on the GEHLEN organization which was obtained in Ludwigsburg (reference here is to the WERER case), indicated that the information on the various personalities was correct, the references to the personal traits of General Gehlen accepted. The name "Arthur" appears repeatedly as the source of the report.

2. At the time the film was obtained in Ludwigsburg, an unknown individual appeared at the home of the sister of Arthur WEBER, former Major, General Staff. The sister resides in Dusseldorf. WEBER himself resides in Dusseldorf, Dichterweg 20. The unknown individual told WEBER's sister that he came from Berlin and must speak to WEBER personally. He also attempted to find out about WEBER and his activities from the sister. WEBER was a fellow student of Count Lehmann Adolf von KIENMANNSEGG at General Staff College and is now associated with a respected firm in Dusseldorf although simultaneously working for the GEHLEN organization. He has worked for the latter organization for over a year, mainly in an effort against the Soviet one. Now (date of report), due to old ties WEBER is working on the bank office for GEHLEN. (UDCOLLEY 14-4185)

3. A short time later the unknown individual appeared in Dusseldorf at WEBER's address and introduced himself as an agent sent from the Soviet Zone. The person made offers to WEBER in an attempt to induce him to go to East Berlin. WEBER's reaction was negative, although the苏联 agent attempted to provoke WEBER to call the police and have him arrested.

4. Members of the GEHLEN staff hold the opinion that:

a. The factual personnel situation included in the film report was another indication that there was at least one traitor in the midst of the organization.

b. The propagatory content of the report made to WEBER, whose identity and activities are known, further strengthens the opinion concerning a traitor in their ranks.

c. The film document, which shows the very approach to WEBER, stems from opposition to the GEHLEN organization within the Federal Republic in an attempt to publicize the same rather than representing a genuine operation of the GEHLEN organization.

d. By virtue of the fact that the name "Arthur" appears in the film document and WEBER is identified by an individual it is probably an attempt by the GEHLEN organization to have WEBER considered as a suspect by the GEHLEN headquarters. With the increasing sense of insecurity, had WEBER called attention to this haste, it would probably resulted in a press conference and headlines!

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"plant-post" or "Double Agent" in the GEHLEN organization. Actually, GEHLEN is not considered a suspect by GEHLEN.

5. With all due respect to General GEHLEN, there is not enough resoluteness in taking the necessary security measures. Examples of this are as follows:

a. There are in the organization persons such as Walther SELFE and Karl SCHMITZ as well as a whole group of other persons, who gained entrance into the organization on the basis of their experience about which they made false statements. SELFE and SCHMITZ were suspect in the investigation of treason cases. All of the suspicious against these people are known to the responsible, but a removal of these people is only possible when probabilities presented which could stand up in court. Such a situation would not do in an intelligence organization.

b. As a result of the finding of a secret document in Schwäbisch Gmünd, immediate contact was established with the political police and the LKA (Landeskriminalamt) and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Stuttgart. No repression was gathered, however, that the situation was being handled without any particular interest, and especially not in connection with being called in on the case. This matter was reported to the headquarters, and independent action was taken. GEHLEN was hesitant to invade the jurisdiction of the state police because of this. Rudolf RÖHM has not yet been interrogated.

6. Paul RÖHM, alias LUTZ, has a very unusual background for his present activities and does not say anything. In the first place, RÖHM would a good job. He is interested in the business of his father-in-law, (the same man), and there is also the friendship between RÖHM and Fritz GRAMER (the one connected with the KPD). Solely through his close association with GEHLEN, RÖHM has discredited himself for continuing to work for GEHLEN. Anyone could fall temporarily for GRAMER, but the relationship between RÖHM and GRAMER has already lasted too long.

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6. In the East Zone press release of December 1953, the following personality is mentioned, among many others: "Friedel HINTZE, Unkel/Rhine, Germany, Bahnhofstrasse, without number, born in 1918, agent (female) of GEHLEN and of the French Intelligence Service." It is a fact that HINTZE once worked for GEHLEN. However, she never worked for the French. The Soviet Zone press release otherwise matches the entry on the GEHLEN information card, where HINTZE's address is even given as "Bahnhofstrasse, without number". The following is known about the HINTZE case: (fmu) OTTEN, a close friend of Dr. Wilhelm H. SCHMITZ, recruited HINTZE for KPD (Komunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) coverage. At that time, Ludwig ALBERT was responsible for NW, and OTTEN was his subordinate. OTTEN had promised HINTZE not to give her name to his superiors, and all admonition notwithstanding, he stubbornly held to that promise. Shortly after his last interview on the HINTZE case with OTTEN, ALBERT relinquished his NW field of activities to Carl SCHUETZ, for whom FELPE had set up the GEHLEN office in Dusseldorf. The turning over of the business by ALBERT to SCHUETZ took place in the Hotel Kaiserhof in Baden. Present at the time were also FELPE and OTTEN. Whereas ALBERT, in consideration of OTTEN's commitment to HINTZE, had agreed to the withholding of her real name (she was known by the cover name "Wilhelmine"), SCHUETZ brusquely demanded her real name. FELPE and SCHUETZ then took OTTEN sharply to task, stating that if he kept up his obstinacy, his job could not last long. To this, OTTEN merely said, "As you please!", an attitude which ALBERT rightly terms a clear-cut stand. In the course of time, OTTEN softened, however, and gave HINTZE's real name to SCHUETZ and FELPE. That is how she was carried in the information card file. It is believed HINTZE has since been dropped as unproductive. Inasmuch as many other names of agents and co-workers mentioned in the Soviet Zone press release were within the sphere of knowledge of SCHUETZ and FELPE, the suspicion against them remains. The OD is aware of these factors.

9. One (fmu) von BECHMANN, cover name METERS, of the GEHLEN OD, carries out security assignments in Munich-Pullach and the Munich area. Ludwig ALBERT, who fully trusts von BECHMANN, had a talk with the latter, in the course of which he stressed the need for keeping an eye on FELPE. von BECHMANN promised his cooperation.

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